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REPORT OF THE CALIFORNIA
COMMISSION ON THE LAW
OF PRE-EMPTION*
Section 11 of Article XI of the California Constitution provides:
Any county, city, town or township may make and enforce
within its limits all such local, police, sanitary and other regula-
tions as are not in conflict with general laws.
We are not so much concerned here with the scope of power granted
to local government by the words "local, police, sanitary and other
regulations," as we are with the limitation placed on the exercise of
*On October 6, 1966 Governor Edmund G. Brown created this Commission
and appointed thirteen members to it. Subsequently, a fourteenth Commissioner
was appointed. The stated reason for the creation of this Commission was the
Governor's belief that the time had arrived "to bring together representative lead-
ership from local government and from our law schools to undertake a systematic
and practically based analysis of the principle areas in which pre-emption-by-
implication has been, or is likely to be, held by the courts to exist." The Commis-
sion was charged with the duty to study seventeen legislative areas and any others
which, in the judgment of the Commissioners, ought to be examined. The Com-
mission was asked to recommend to the Governor and to the Legislature in its
1967 session which of these legislative areas should be explicitly pre-empted by
the State, which ones should be opened to additional regulation by local govern-
ment, and in which cases the issue of pre-emption should be left to judicial deter-
mination. This Commission has drawn upon the broad experience of its own mem-
bership as well as upon the expert opinions of others. [The membership of this
Commission is composed of: 2 County Supervisors, 2 City Councilmen, 2 Sheriffs,
1 Mayor, 1 District Attorney, 1 City Attorney, 1 Chief Assistant County Counsel,
3 Law Professors, and 1 attorney engaged in private practice.]. A number of per-
sons interested in the matter have given us the benefit of their attendance and
participation at our meetings. Furthermore, the Governor's office and the League
of California Cities have, by letter, encouraged people interested in the problem
to send us their views in writing. Many local government officials have responded
to these requests.
The Commission first met on October 14, 1966. Altogether there have been
eleven meetings of the Commission, two of which were held in San Francisco. The
rest were held in Los Angeles. [Portions of this report have been omitted and
footnotes have been edited and renumbered-Ed.]
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that power by the words "as are not in conflict with general laws."
The problem of pre-emption centers about this limitation. Thus,
when a local government has enacted a regulation under the authority
of this section, its validity necessarily depends on a determination
that the regulation is not "in conflict with general laws." If it is in
conflict with general (i.e., state) laws, the California Constitution re-
quires the courts to declare the local regulation invalid.
The difficulty arises as to the scope of the "general laws" and the
meaning of the term, "in conflict." In the performance of their duty
to interpret and apply this less-than-crystal-clear Constitutional pro-
vision, the courts of California have handed down numerous decisions
which have grappled with these terms. It is now clear that if the local
legislation were to duplicate exactly the state law it would be held
to be in conflict with general law. The same result would follow if
the local regulation purported to permit that which state law forbids,
or purported to forbid that which state law permits.
It is also clear that when the Legislature undertakes, or has under-
taken, to regulate some activity, it may declare its intention "to occupy
the field;" that is to say, to pre-empt the particular field of regulation.
The effect of such a declaration reserving unto the State the sole power
to regulate an activity is to put local regulation in the pre-empted
field "in conflict with general laws."
The problem of implied pre-emption is presented when the Legisla-
ture has not made clear its intention with respect to pre-emption of
the field, and when the local regulation does not duplicate general
law, nor permit that which the general law forbids, nor forbid that
which the general law permits. In 1962, the case of In re Lane' was
decided by the California Supreme Court on the grounds of implied
pre-emption. Although the doctrine of implied pre-emption did not
originate in the Lane case,2 the Court's decision touched raw nerve
ends at the local government level when it held invalid a Los Angeles
ordinance which made "resorting" (i.e., fornication) a crime.
A majority of the Court, in an opinion by Justice Marshall Mc-
Comb, held that the Legislature had, by implication, pre-empted the
field of the criminal aspects of sexual activity. Thus the local regula-
1. 58 Cal. 2d 99, 372 P.2d 897, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1962).
2. See e.g., Horwith v. City of Fresno, 74 Cal. App. 2d 443, 168 P.2d 767
(1946), and Abbot v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. 2d 674, 349 P.2d 974, 3 Cal.
Rptr. 158 (1960). For an excellent discussion of the history of the doctrine, see
Blease, Civil Liberties and the California Law of Preemption, 17 THe HASTINGS
L.J. 517 (1965).
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tion was found to be in conflict with general law and therefore void.
There was no express legislative declaration of intention to exclude
local regulation, but the Court believed that it could ascertain from
the extensive scope of the Penal Code sections covering the criminal
aspects of sexual activity "an intention to adopt a general scheme for
the regulation of this subject." Having thus found by implication
an intention to pre-empt the field, the local regulation had to fall.
In the wake of the Lane case there have been a number of decisions
dealing with the doctrine of implied pre-emption. Some highly pub.
licized cases have held local ordinances invalid on this basis. Others,
such as In re Hubbard,3 have found no implied intent to occupy the
field and thus have upheld local regulations.
In the five years since In re Lane was decided a considerable contro-
versy has arisen over the doctrine of implied pre-emption. Unfortu-
nately the controversy has often generated more heat than light. There
has been much misunderstanding about the effect of the doctrine.
For example, one misapprehension is that pre-emption somehow di-
vests local government of its law enforcement powers, as distinct from
its law-making powers. Thus it has erroneously been supposed that
In re Lane prevents the local police agencies from enforcing state laws
aimed at prostitution. This of course is not true. They can and do
enforce such laws. What they cannot do under the Lane decision is
enforce a local ordinance which makes "resorting" a crime.
In substance, the pre-emption question is concerned with deciding
the proper division of regulatory powers between state and local gov-
ernment.4 We believe that such decisions, whether legislative or judi-
cial, should be based on factors pertinent to the issue whether it is
necessary or desirable to have uniform regulation of given conduct
within the state. Therefore, we now turn to an examination of the
principles which we believe are involved and make our recommenda-
tions as to the implementation of these principles. Their application
may not be altogether easy. They may lack that degree of certainty
which many may desire. It has frequently been asserted that the doc-
trine of implied pre-emption has added a new dimension of uncer-
tainty to an already uncertain area of the law. But it must be borne
3. 62 Cal. 2d 119, 396 P.2d 809, 41 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1964), involving the valid-
ity of a Long Beach Municipal Ordinance regulating certain kinds of gambling.
4. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7 deals with but a part of that question. Although
the concept of "municipal affairs," which is dealt with in Sections 6 and 8 of
Article XI has at times been brought into the discussion of pre-emption, we be-
lieve that the two matters are separate and distinct. Therefore, the concept of
"municipal affairs" will not be dealt with in this Report.
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in mind that the price of certainty is too high when it involves a
failure to face the real policy questions involved.
II.
The Commission has attempted to identify the criteria which it
believes the Legislature should consider in determining whether in
a specific fact situation the power of local governments to regulate
should be pre-empted. In the discussion which follows we set forth,
first, these criteria. At that point we also appraise current proposals
for legislative action with respect to pre-emption. Next we apply
the criteria we have identified to make recommendations whether
local power to regulate should be pre-empted in a number of specific
fact situations. Finally, we set forth a draft bill of a "general law,"
which would provide these criteria for the courts in deciding cases
in which no explicit legislative determination with respect to pre-emp-
tion has been made.
III.
The State Constitution is not neutral in the allocation of regulatory
power between the State Legislature and local governments. It is true
that cities and counties have been given constitutional authority to
adopt regulatory measures, but only if the local measures do not con-
flict with general (i.e., state) laws. Thus, it rests with the State Legis-
lature to determine whether it desires to regulate specific types of
conduct, and, once having done so, whether it desires to permit any
additional regulation of similar conduct by local governments. The
latter function, it should be emphasized, calls for legislative judgment
based upon a thorough consideration of competing policies. What
are those policies?
The central inquiry implicit in the concept of pre-emption is
whether there should be statewide uniformity in the regulation of
specific conduct. If there is no need for statewide uniformity, there
is no need for state law to pre-empt local power to regulate. If it ap-
pears desirable that there be statewide uniformity, the legislative de-
cision to pre-empt or not pre-empt should be based on whether the
need for statewide uniformity outweighs the need of local government
regulation. We thus emphasize the need of local government to be
permitted to respond quickly and adequately to the varied types of
local problems which continually arise throughout the state; for, in
general, a problem must be of statewide magnitude before it reason-
ably can be expected that the Legislature will respond to it. This is
the core of the pre-emption question-to consider, on the one hand,
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the need for statewide uniformity of regulation of a specific type of
conduct, and, on the other hand, the need of local governments to be
able to respond to local, as distinguished from statewide, problems.
There are two basic factors either of which creates a need for state-
wide uniformity of regulation of specific conduct:
(1) The desirability of freedom of movement of persons or goods
within the State.
Multiplicity of local regulations affecting the movement of goods or
persons generally will impede or burden commerce to the economic
detriment of the State. Local regulations might seek to protect local
business against outside competition, again causing serious adverse
effect on the economy of the State. Varying local regulations may cre-
ate a patchwork of standards which would tend to cause confusion,
obstacles to the movement of a transient population, and imposition
of regulatory sanctions on individuals who cannot reasonably be ex-
pected to know varying standards as they travel about the State.
(2) The desirability of a statewide consensus.
We refer here to an examination of the nature of the conduct
sought to be regulated and the desirability that, if such conduct is to
be regulated, the regulation be based upon a statewide rather than a
local consensus. Thus regulation of some types of conduct should
reflect a broader consensus than the regulation of other types of con-
duct which can more appropriately be left to a local viewpoint. For
example, conduct which does not pose a substantial threat, direct or
indirect, to the health, safety or welfare of others should be regulated
on the basis of a statewide consensus. We refer here to such conduct
as recreational gambling in one's home or wearing the attire of the
opposite sex in public (where not done for the purpose of committing
a crime), and describe such conduct in this report as conduct "within
the realm of individual privacy." Similarity, freedom of expression
should be regulated on a basis of a statewide consensus. Regulation
of such conduct requires the making of delicate judgments concerning
governmental control of individuals. For the protection of individuals
against varying local pressures and sensibilities, these judgments, if
to be made at all, should be made by the larger and more broadly
based State legislative body. This would not be so with respect to
regulation of, for example, the carrying or use of dangerous weapons.
Regulation of this type of conduct might be left to local consensus to
supplement general law.
If either or both of the above factors are present to a significant
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degree in a given factual situation, local regulation should neverthe-
less be permitted unless the need for statewide uniformity outweighs
the need to regulate at the local level. This requires consideration of:
(1) whether the nature and magnitude of the problem varies
throughout the State, and
(2) the imminence and gravity of the harm associated with the
conduct.
The Legislature should make the judgment, insofar as it is possible
for it to do so, as to which of these competing needs-statewide uni-
formity or local power to regulate-should prevail when they are in
conflict. This should be done, to the maximum feasible extent, with
relation both to existing regulatory legislation and such legislation
as may be enacted in the future. In addition, the Legislature should
enact legislation which would provide in effect that any pre-emption
issue which has not been explicitly dealt with by the Legislature
should be resolved by having the courts consider the same factors
which the Legislature presumably does when it explicitly deals with
the issue.5 The draft bill set forth in Part V of this Report would
carry out this recommendation.
We should point out that the approach we recommend differs from
the basic concept of a number of bills which have been introduced
and are likely to be introduced in the Legislature dealing with the
pre-emption question. Many such bills provide, in one way or an-
other, that local regulation of conduct would not be pre-empted unless
the Legislature specifically so declared by statute. In effect these bills
would have the Legislature impose on itself a "duty" to resolve the
pre-emption question every time it enacts a regulatory statute and
to resolve that question for every regulatory statute it has enacted
5. A general observation should be made about the difficulty encountered in
defining "the field" that has been pre-empted. This problem exists as much for
the Legislature when it undertakes to state its intention to pre-empt, as it does
for the court when it decides that a "field" has been pre-empted. For example,
In re Lane held that the State has occupied the field with regard to the criminal
aspects of sexual activity. 58 Cal. 2d 99, 372, P.2d 897, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1962).
This, we think, is much too broad. Under the sweep of this decision, it has been
held that local regulation of "topless entertainment" is precluded, as being within
the field of "the criminal aspects of sexual activity." An independent consideration
of the need for statewide uniformity in the regulation of "topless entertainment"
should be made rather than being swept under the label of "criminal aspects of
sexual activity." Thus, it is imperative that all legislative or judicial decisions re-
lating to pre-emption be prefaced by a careful attempt to define narrowly the
"field" that is pre-empted. Conversely, if the Legislature proposes to pre-empt all
but a portion of a "field," it is likewise imperative that the portion to be left
open for possible local regulation be carefully defined.
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in the past. We agree that it would be most desirable for the Legisla-
ture to carry out such a task. But if the Legislature does not do so,
these bills provide that there would then be no pre-emption. Thus,
failure to make an explicit decision about pre-emption in a given
factual situation would create a conclusive presumption that the
Legislature had decided that there should be no pre-emption. We
believe that this approach, which these bills share, is unwise for two
reasons:
(1) it rests on an unsupportable premise about the functioning
of the legislative process; and
(2) it would produce ad hoc pre-emption doctrine, not based upon
any consistently applied principles which are reasonably related to
whether or not there should be pre-emption.
Because this approach, based upon the failure of the Legislature
to express itself on the pre-emption question, is apparently widely
held, we will here consider in greater detail our objections.
If the Legislature fails explicitly to resolve the question of pre-
emption with respect to specific factual situations in which the pre-
emption question can arise, it is unrealistic to proceed on the con.
dusive presumption that the reason it failed to do so was because it
conduded there should be no pre-emption. There are a number of
reasons why the Legislature might not resolve the pre-emption ques-
tions in a given factual situation.6
It is unsound to construct public policy on the assumption that the
Legislature is ready, willing, and able to make a decision about any
and every pre-emption issue which might be hypothesized, thereby
giving unwarranted significance to the failure of the Legislature to
act on a specific question. Such a view of the legislative process rests
on what has been referred to as the "myth of an all-competent and
indefatigable" legislature. 7 In view of the vast range of matters com-
peting for the attention and action of the Legislature, as a factual mat-
ter and as a practical necessity, it is not at every moment ready, will-
6. For example:
(a) The Legislature not having considered the specific issue involved;
(b) Inability to reach a majority view either way on the issue of pre-emp-tion;
(c) A determination that insistence upon resolving the pre-emption issue
would jeopardize passage of the regulatory legislation itself;(d) The difficulty and consequent inability to agree upon the scope of the
"field" in which pre-emption would or would not occur.
7. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAK-
ING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 541 (tent. ed. 1958).
Washington University Open Scholarship
PRE-EMPTION
ing, and able to act and to express itself on every conceivable pre-
emption question which might arise or which might have arisen when
existing legislation was enacted.
Thus we do not think it wise to enact a statute that would provide
that where the Legislature fails to declare that the power to regulate
specific conduct has been pre-empted, it shall be conclusively pre-
sumed that the reason for the failure so to declare was a policy de-
cision that there should be no pre-emption.
The second fundamental objection to the approach adopted in
pending bills (that local power to regulate is not pre-empted unless
the Legislature explicitly so declares) is that the pattern of pre-
emption doctrine which would emerge would not be based upon any
consistently applied principles. A random pattern of pre-emption,
stemming from failure of the Legislature to declare itself (for any of
a number of reasons which may have nothing to do with whether
there should or should not be pre-emption) would be the result of
adoption of the approach contained in pending bills. Since, as we
have pointed out, the basis for pre-emption or non-pre-emption can
rest upon definite, consistent principles, the effort should be made
to have specific issues resolved in accordance with such principles
rather than haphazardly.
[Section IV concerning seventeen specific problem areas set out in the
Governor's charge to the Commission has been omitted-Ed.]
V.
In Part III we set forth the principles which should be adverted to
in deciding the policy questions involved in pre-emption. We there
urged the Legislature to use those criteria in deciding specific pre-
emption problems. We believe that these criteria are equally valid
and applicable to the court's decision when the Legislature has not
explicitly expressed itself on pre-emption in a specific fact situation.
We need not repeat here our comments in Part III regarding the
dubious wisdom of a conclusive presumption of non-pre-emption
where the Legislature has not specifically articulated its determina-
tion on pre-emption in a given context.
We emphasize that the bill which we propose would, in all cases
where the pre-emption issue can arise, give effect to the principles
which we have suggested the Legislature should consider in making
its pre-emption decisions.
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We also emphasize that the enactment of this bill would bring no
magic "certainty" into the law, but we repeat that "the price of cer-
tainty is too high when it involves a failure to face the real policy
questions involved."
The following is the text of the statute which we recommend for
adoption:
A local, police, sanitary or other regulation authorized by Sec-
tion 11 of Article XI of the Constitution shall be permitted not-
withstanding a state statute on the same or a related subject
except only in the following cases:
1. When the regulation duplicates general law.
2. When the regulation authorizes that which is expressly
prohibited by general law.
3. When the regulation prohibits that which is expressly per-
mitted by general law.
4. When general law expressly prohibits that type of regula-
tion.
5. When the need for statewide uniformity in regulation is
greater than the need for the city or county to impose such reg-
ulation.
(a) There shall be considered to be a need for statewide
uniformity in regulation of the conduct if
(i) the city or county regulation would have a signifi-
cant adverse affect upon the movement of persons or goods
within the state, or
(ii) the conduct involved poses no substantial threat,
direct or indirect, to the safety, health or welfare of others,
or
(iii) the city or county regulation is a regulation of
speech or expression.
(b) In evaluating the need for the city or county to im-
pose the regulation there shall be considered
(i) the degree to which the nature and magnitude of
the harm which is sought to be prevented by the regula-
tion vary from place to place within the State, and
(ii) the imminence and gravity of the harm which is
sought to be prevented by the regulation.
DISSENT TO PORTIONS OF THE REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION
The members of the commission have sincerely attempted in many
hours of give and take discussion to resolve divergent points of view
which are based in large part upon individual experience. Fortu-
nately, much progress has been made and the areas of disagreement
have been substantially narrowed. The points of difference referred
Washington University Open Scholarship
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to hereinafter simply reflect the difficulty in arriving at a consensus
upon an extremely complex problem.
The commission has agreed upon the criteria which it believes the
Legislature should consider in determining whether in a specific fact
situation the power of cities and counties to regulate should be pre-
empted.
The criteria are predicated upon the premise that the central in-
quiry implicit in the concept of pre-emption is whether there should
be statewide uniformity in the regulation of specific conduct. If it
appears desirable that there be statewide uniformity, the legislative
decision to pre-empt or not pre-empt should be based on whether that
need for statewide uniformity outweighs the need of local government
to regulate.
Statewide uniformity would be considered to be desirable if:
(a) The local regulation of the conduct would have a signifi-
cant adverse affect upon the movement of persons or goods within
the State;
(b) The local regulation would affect conduct which poses no
substantial threat, direct or indirect, to the safety, health or wel-
fare of others;
(c) The local regulation is a regulation of speech or expression.
In evaluating the need for local regulation there would be con-
sidered:
(1) The degree to which the nature and magnitude of the
harm which is sought to be prevented by the regulation vary
from place to place within the State.
(2) The imminence and gravity of the harm which is sought
to be prevented by the regulation.
[The next portion of the text concerning gambling and topless
waitresses has been omitted-Ed.]
While we agree that the [above] criteria developed by the commis-
sion provide a proper basis for legislative consideration in determin-
ing whether to pre-empt, in our opinion the criteria are not adequate
for use by our courts in determining legislative intent.
The decision as to whether or not general laws in any area should
operate to the exclusion of local regulation is a political public policy
decision that must be made by the Legislature.
For example, how is a court to determine the "need" for local regu-
lation? Are the courts to substitute their independent judgment of
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the relative need for local legislation for that of the local legislative
body?
As has been pointed out before, Section Il of Article XI is a consti-
tutional delegation to local government to "make and enforce" regu-
lations "not in conflict with general laws." The people have placed
upon the Legislature the responsibility of resolving the question of
pre-emption in those factual situations in which the pre-emption
question can arise. If the Legislature does not choose to resolve the
question, the Constitution establishes the right of cities and counties
to regulate.
In our opinion the public interest is best served by an express
declaration of legislative intent not to pre-empt the regulatory powers
of cities and counties unless there is an actual conflict between State
law and local regulation; or there is an express declaration of legisla-
tive intention to exclude local regulation of specifically described ac-
tivity.
The following draft of a bill which was submitted to the members
of the commission early in its deliberations will, if enacted into law,
resolve the question of implied pre-emption in a manner consistent
with Section 11 of Article XI of the State Constitution:
An act to add Section 9613 to the Government Code relating
to construction of statutes.
The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
Section 1. Section 9613 is added to the Government Code to
read:
9613. A statute shall not be construed to interfere with or
preclude local, police, sanitary, and other regulations authorized
by Section 11 of Article XI of the Constitution and local regula-
tions shall be permitted notwithstanding a statute on the same
or a related subject, except only in the following cases:
1. When the regulation duplicates general law.
2. When the regulation authorizes or purports to authorize
that which is expressly prohibited by general law.
3. When the regulation prohibits or purports to prohibit
that which is expressly permitted by general law.
4. When there is a comprehensive scheme of legislation on
the same subject by general law, and such general law:
(a) Expressly provides that it has occupied the entire field of
such legislation; or
(b) Expressly prohibits other and further regulations in the
field of such legislation.
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